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Imagine an Ansel Adams photograph of the spring thaw in a remote
Rocky Mountain wilderness. The roar of a spring freshet cascading over
the boulders near the tree line is almost audible from the picture alone.
Now, using a computerized process of digital retouching, reduce the
streamflow to a trickle. The scene loses its tumult and becomes more like
a hushed still-life. Take a second photograph in August or September.
Retouch the original to eliminate the stream and all of the signs of wild-
life that it attracts; color the landscape yellow or brown instead of deep,
mountain green. The spring and summer photographs, those with the
water that naturally flows in the valley and those without that water, will
hardly seem pictures of the same place. The presence or absence of the
stream's water, which sustains both plant and animal communities,
causes this difference.
Assume now that the area involved is federally designated wilder-
ness, and that the cause of the altered landscape is an upstream dam and
reservoir system that diverts the water before it flows into the wilderness.
Assume further that the federal official charged by Congress with the
stewardship of the wilderness has, as a matter of federal law, a water
right that could prevent the diversion and thereby allow the spring
freshet to roar and the summer stream to flow. Can that federal official
stand aside and permit the upstream diversion without violating his legal
duties of stewardship?
This question is at the core of Sierra Club v. Block I and is the ques-
tion explored in this essay. As the opening example highlights, wilder-
ness values can disappear if federal officials have no duty to protect them.
In Sierra Club, the federal wilderness manager (the Secretary of Agricul-
ture) argued that he lacked any federal legal right to protect wilderness
streamflows. The Secretary also claimed that, even if wilderness protec-
tive water rights did exist, he possessed the unreviewable discretion to
refrain from asserting them.
* Interim Dean and Professor of Law. Wayne State University Law School. A. A 1969 J. D.
1973, University of Michigan.
1. 622 F.Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985).
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The central thesis of this essay is that the reserved water rights of
the federal government are fixed at the time they are created and that the
federal official to whom the government entrusts reserved water rights
has an obligation to assert those rights to their fullest extent. Applied to
the wilderness setting, this duty leaves the Secretary without any author-
ity to deny that the rights exist, without any discretion to fix the amount
of water reserved, and, most importantly, without any discretion to fail
to assert vigorously the reserved rights. These aggressive claims about
the responsibility of federal officials to vindicate reserved rights extend
beyond the wilderness context to cover as well other species of federal
reserved water rights, such as those favoring Indian reservations.
The body of the essay has two major parts. Part I reviews some of
the basics of prior appropriation law and the federal reserved water
rights doctrine, and attempts to show the gravity of the wilderness re-
served rights issues raised in Sierra Club. It demonstrates that real water
use conflicts can and will arise between those who wish to reserve water
rights for wilderness streamflows and private appropriators under state
law who wish to use that water in different ways. Part I also summarizes
the arguments supporting the existence of reserved water rights for feder-
ally designated wilderness areas.
Part II of the essay argues that managing federal officials must faith-
fully assert these reserved water rights. The initial discussion explains
why federal officers responsible for reserved rights lack the power to deny
that reserved rights exist or to reduce the size of the reserved rights.
Thereafter, the essay explores why these officials are under affirmative
duties to vindicate reserved rights. The essay considers counterargu-
ments based on Heckler v. Chaney, the recent United States Supreme
Court case which grants administrative officials unreviewable discretion
to refrain from enforcement actions, and finds these arguments unpersua-
sive in this context. Finally, the essay discusses the discretion federal
officials have to negotiate and reach compromise settlements in reserved
rights disputes and finds the permissible range of discretion narrow.
I. RESERVED RIGHTS AND WILDERNESS STREAMFLOWS
A. The Potential Conflict Between Wilderness Reserved Rights and
State Law Water Users
The important water resource management issues probed in this es-
say may be unfamiliar to some readers. Federal wilderness lands are lo-
cated principally in the arid Western states, which employ the prior
appropriation doctrine as the basis for their water law. Unlike the ripa-
rian doctrine of the East, under which most water rights are appurtenant
to neighboring lands, prior appropriation severs water from the land and
creates an independent regime of water rights. More specifically, an indi-
vidual in a prior appropriation state acquires rights to a flow of water by
applying that water to a beneficial use, without regard to his ownership
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of land bordering the stream. With few exceptions, a water user acquires
a water right simply by physically withdrawing as yet unappropriated
water from a stream and transporting that water to the place of use.2
State law protects these water rights against interference by other water
claimants on the basis of seniority: prior in time is prior in right.
Superimposed on these state systems of quantified priorities are fed-
eral reserved water rights. These rights exist by virtue of a common law
doctrine created by the United States Supreme Court.3 The basic thrust
of the reserved rights doctrine is that the federal government, by dedicat-
ing federal lands to a specific use, simultaneously reserves the water
found on those lands for that use. The amount of water reserved is the
amount the government needs to fulfill the specific purposes for which
the land is to be used. To prevent a conflict with existing state-created
appropriative rights, the reserved rights doctrine operates only on waters
that are unappropriated when the federal government reserves the lands.
For example, in the case of federal land reserved in 1900 for an Indian
reservation, the federal reserved rights would be subordinate to all pre-
1900 appropriations but would be superior to all post-1900 appropria-
tions. The water rights possessed by the Indian reservation would have
this priority over post-1900 appropriations, even if the resident Indians
did not begin using their water until many years after subsequent appro-
priators obtained their rights.
The possibility that the federal government might assert reserved
rights after many years of dormancy can retard water-dependent eco-
nomic development. The existence of an unused and unquantified federal
water right can disrupt the plans of a later appropriator, who needs cer-
tainty in his own water flow before he will make water-dependent invest-
ments with a long useful life. Federal reserved rights, particularly
reserved rights that protect instream flows, can directly prevent eco-
nomic development. As an example, a reserved right might require that
sufficient water remain in a stream to enable an Indian tribe to fish in the
stream. Water that must remain in the stream to support fish popula-
tions is unavailable for diversion and use by other appropriators, who
might use the water for other, possibly more economically valuable
purposes.
Reserved rights to protect wilderness streamflows often have little or
no impact on potential development. Most designated wilderness areas
are relatively remote and near the headwaters of streams; most state law
appropriators, by contrast, are located downstream. Thus, a federal re-
served right that maintained water in the stream until the water flowed
through the wilderness area would not affect these downstream uses. A
2. In many states an appropriator must physically divert and withdraw the water to perfect a
valid appropriative right. Some jurisdictions have modified modern appropriation doctrine, how-
ever, so that appropriation can insure minimum streamflows. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-
2,107 to 46-2,119 (1984).
3. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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wilderness reserved right of this type would also permit upstream uses, as
long as the upstream appropriators did not compromise the superior fed-
eral right. Thus, an upstream use would be permissible if it returned the
bulk of the water to the stream without significantly polluting or altering
the timing of the flow.
A wilderness reserved right will usually affect adversely an upstream
diversion and storage project.4 This is of concern because upstream di-
version and storage projects offer attractive benefits. They can alter the
timing of flows from a high-flow, low-demand period like the spring to a
low-flow, high-demand period like the late summer or early fall. At up-
stream locations, water may be more abundant, often in the form of snow
pack. In addition, many upstream areas have deep, narrow valleys suita-
ble for constructing dams at a low cost, which means that water can be
stored there relatively inexpensively. Lands located upstream of wilder-
ness areas almost assuredly are undeveloped lands, usually in public
ownership. This too reduces the cost of purchasing flowage easements on
these lands. Storage of water upstream of a wilderness area also expands
the potential for use of the water at distant points. Water impounded
and diverted at a relatively high elevation upstream of a wilderness area
can flow by gravity to its intended point of use, without any need for
pumping. This potential cost-economy is particularly important if the
destination of the water is itself at high elevation, or if the destination is
another water basin. Consider, for example, water on the west slope of
the Rocky Mountains needed to meet the water needs of Denver on the
east slope.' The diversion of this water at high elevations, perhaps above
wilderness areas, will minimize costs by reducing the pumping or tunnel-
ing needed to transport the water across the mountains.
B. The Reserved Rights Doctrine
Federal reserved water rights exist as a matter of federal law. The
United States Supreme Court has stated:
[Wihen the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public
domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by
implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so
4. "Diversion" describes instances in which users physically withdraw water from the water-
course and transport it by canal or other conveyance device to a distant location for use. "Storage"
refers to building dam and reservoir systems. Some form of storage apparatus almost invariably
accompanies diversion projects. Storage provides a head of water to permit diversion and, often,
permits users to tap the diversion when the water is in demand, not when it would naturally flow
down the stream. Even an upstream storage facility that controls flows for the benefit of a diversion
facility downstream of the wilderness could affect profoundly the timing of water flows through the
wilderness.
5. A Colorado study of state law appropritions that might be affected by recognition of re-
served rights for wilderness instream flows concluded that the "only significant occurence of poten-
tial conflict is above the Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument. ... Letter from
David Getches (Executive Director Colorado DNR) and Jeris Danielson (Colorado state water engi-
neer) to U.S. Sen. Gary Hart & U.S. Reps. Hank Brown & Ken Kramer (Feb. 24, 1986).
[Vol. 1986
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
doing the United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated
water which vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to
the rights of future appropriators. s
Federal reserved rights arise under federal law, yet they are similar
in many ways to appropriations made under state law. Reserved rights
are like appropriative rights in their most essential qualities-they are
rights of priority to an ascertainable quantity of water. Although the
federal government reserves rights in a manner that differs radically from
the creation of appropriative rights under state law, reserved rights, once
created, function much like appropriative rights. Reserved rights protect
their holder on the basis of priority in time against invasion by junior
water users.
The similarity of reserved rights to appropriative rights goes even
further. The rights are meaured when created. In the appropriation sys-
tem, the actual beneficial use made of the water provides the measure of
the water right; under the federal common law reserved rights doctrine,
the congressional or executive act that creates the reserved rights pro-
vides, as the measure of the right, the amount of unappropriated water
required to meet the needs of the reserved land. In United States v. New
Mexico,7 the United States Supreme Court stated that when "water is
necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal reservation was
created,. . . the United States intended to reserve the necessary water."8
The Supreme Court quantified the amount of water reserved by refering
to historical facts about Congress's intent and to the amount of then un-
appropriated water necessary to fulfill that intent. Although the Court
did not attach a numerical measure to the right, the only uncertainty lay
in divining the precise intent and proving the amount of water then
needed.
Recent decisions in which courts have quantified reserved rights
lend support to the view that reserved rights are fully defined in terms of
quantity when created.9 Contemporary reserved rights cases focus, first,
on identifying the purposes for which water is reserved and, second, on
6. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
7. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
8. Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
9. Litigation that would quantify reserved rights was inhibited for many years because the
federal government refused to waive sovereign immunity and expose those rights in litigation. Even-
tually, after the Western states waged a long battle, Congress in 1952 passed the McCarran Amend-
ment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982), which waived federal immunity in certain qualifying general stream
adjudications. See also United States v. District Court of Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971). For
roughly 30 years, most reserved rights litigation focused on procedural and jurisdictional disputes
that arose in interpreting the Amendment. In 1976, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
Congress in enacting the McCarran Amendment had not only consented to waive immunity but had
also established the state courts as the preferred forum for such lawsuits. Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Judgments that quantify reserved rights
receive res judicata effect. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
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determining the amount of water needed to satisfy those purposes. 0 As
noted above, the litmus test that the United States Supreme Court now
uses to determine the extent of reserved water rights is stated in terms of
the amount of water needed to accomplish the reservation's purpose at
the time of the reservation.
Purpose review of this type is a backward-looking inquiry that at-
tempts to determine a matter of historical intent. In undertaking this
review, courts consider only the primary purposes of a particular land
reservation. Only these purposes are weighed in determining the amount
of water that the federal government reserved. This limitation to the
primary purposes of the federal reservation narrows the number of pur-
poses that the courts must consider. The limitation does not, however,
alter the fundamental nature of the quantification process. In United
States v. New Mexico,"1 for example, the Supreme Court held that the
only primary purposes of the National Forest system were producing
timber and protecting water flows. The Court refused to entertain re-
served rights claims for instream flows to support recreation, because
recreation was a later, secondary purpose. The focus of the Court's in-
quiry was on the intent of Congress in 1897 when it passed the Organic
Act that established the National Forest System, not on the intent of
Congress in later years when it expanded the aims of the national forests.
Subsequent acts of Congress, and the views of the administrative officials
in charge of the National Forests, failed to affect the primary purposes.
Purpose review, when applied in the wilderness reservation context,
supports the view that Congress intends to reserve water for wilderness
instream flows whenever it creates wilderness areas. As its language and
legislative history make clear, the Wilderness Act has as its primary pur-
pose the preservation of existing natural conditions. The Wilderness Act
lists as its primary purposes "preservation and protection [of wilderness
lands] in their natural condition. . . to secure for the American people
of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of
wilderness."1 2 The Act defines wilderness as "an area where the earth
and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is
a visitor who does not remain . . .[and wilderness is an area] retaining
its primeval character and influence .. 1 . 3 Accordingly, as the Act
and its unusually clear legislative history describe the aims of wilderness,
wilderness designation carries with it an intent to prevent man-induced
changes in the area. Instream flows are part and parcel of the natural
environment which wilderness areas are designed to preserve; 4 those
10. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). See also, e.g., United States v. City
and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
11. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1982).
13. Id. § 1131(c).
14. Judge Kane in Sierra Club v. Block expressed the matter forcefully: "It is beyond cavil that
water is the lifeblood of the wilderness areas. Without water, the wilderness would become deserted
wastelands. In other words, without access to the requisite water, the very purposes for which the
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flows are therefore reserved by wilderness designation.
The Wilderness Act's explicit emphasis on preservation provides a
distinct contrast between wilderness reservations and National Forest
reservations made pursuant to statutes having timber production and wa-
tershed protection as their primary purposes. 5 Because of this distinc-
tion, the New Mexico case does not preclude wilderness instream water
reservations; these reservations foster the primary mandate of the Wil-
derness Act-maintaining land in its present, pristine condition, unal-
tered by human activity.
Courts engage in a second backward-looking process when they un-
dertake to quantify reserved rights. State adjudications that quantify the
rights of private appropriators undertake to determine the amount of
water beneficially applied to the land by each user when he began his use.
Similarly, courts that quantify federal reserved rights attempt to discern
the historical fact of how much water the government impliedly reserved
on the date of the reservation. Changing conditions in the intervening
years are irrelevant to the initial quantification decision.
One of the seminal cases on reserved rights quantification is the fa-
mous case between Arizona and California over rights to Colorado River
water. In Arizona v. California,16 the Supreme Court decided that the
government, when it created certain Indian reservations, reserved
enough water to irrigate the "practicably irrigable acreage" found on the
reservations.' 7 The Court adopted this standard because it fulfilled the
discerned purpose for which the government reserved the water: settling
the tribes into a pastoral life on the reservations. For every Indian reser-
vation sharing that purpose, the reserved right attaches to the amount of
water needed for irrigation. This is a fixed quantity that is calculated as
the product of the number of irrigable acres on the reservation and the
water duty 8 of those acres."
Even before the Supreme Court announced the irrigable acreage
standard, the amount of water reserved was not open to debate; debate
Wilderness Act was established would be entirely defeated." Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842,
862 (D. Colo. 1985). The opinion presents more extensive arguments in favor of implied reservation
of wilderness protective streamflows than the summary arguments adduced in this essay. See also
Comment, Water for Wilderness: Colorado Court Expands Federal Reserved Rights, 16 ENVTL. L.
REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,002 (1986); Comment, Federal Reserved Water Rights in National Forest
Wilderness Areas, 21 LAND & WATER L. REv. 381 (1986).
15. But see Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal
Jurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (1978) (criticizing so re-
strictive a view of National Forest purposes).
16. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
17. Id. at 600-01.
18. The term "water duty" describes the amount of water required to irrigate land during a
growing season. The term is usually expressed as a number of acre-feet of water per acre of land.
For example, if Congress established a 100-acre Indian reservation to provide an agricultural exist-
ence for the tribe with a water duty of 4, the yearly reserved right entitlement of the reservation
would be 400 acre-feet of water (100 acres x 4 acre-feet per acre).
19. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983) (continuing battle regarding irrigable
acreage found within Indian reservations).
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focused only on the formula to calculate the amount. Congress or the
Executive, by fixing the purposes of the reservation and acting to reserve
the land, set the amount. The task left undone was to decide how to
measure the amount of water necessary to fulfill those purposes. "Neces-
sity" here, as shown by the irrigable acreage standard approved by the
Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, is a term of art that refers not so
much to strict physical necessity as it does to necessity to fulfill a dis-
cerned intent.2" Nevertheless, in all cases, the minimum measure of a
reserved water right is the amount of water physically necessary to insure
the success of the primary federal purpose in reserving the land.
A court that quantifies reserved rights by referring to strict physical
necessity engages in an exercise in rote calculation just as much as it does
when it employs the more generous irrigable acreage standard used for
Indian agricultural reservations. In Cappaert v. United States,21 the
United States Supreme Court found that the executive order which re-
served land at Devil's Hole had, among its primary purposes, the goal of
preserving from extinction the biologically extraordinary Devil's Hole
pupfish. After identifying this purpose, all that remained was to calcu-
late mechanically the water needed to preserve the pupfish. Testimony
established that the pupfish would perish unless the water level main-
tained in Devil's Hole was high enough to permit continued pupfish re-
production. To sustain this needed water level, nearby groundwater
pumpers with later priority dates were required to curtail their pumping.
Case law, in short, supports the position that reserved rights are def-
inite in amount when created. The opposite claim-that the rights are
indefinite at the time of creation-lacks any real legal support. But even
if it were supportable, this position would give little comfort to water
users with later priority dates. The concept of "indefinite" reserved
rights is itself unclear. The concept could mean that those rights are
subject to revision by later federal action, which would be supreme under
Article IV of the Constitution.22 Under this possibility, Congress or the
Executive could alter at any time the quantity of water reserved in re-
sponse to perceived changes in the water needs of the reserved lands. If
the federal government has this power, however, no logical reason would
limit its exercise to adjustments that decrease rather than increase the
size of the right. The possibility of increase, of course, would pose grave
risks for later appropriators. The Supreme Court has for policy reasons
evident in water adjudication laws rejected the view that the amount of
reserved rights could change over time. Such flexibility would conflict
with the desire for certainty evident in the McCarran Amendment's
waiver of federal immunity for state adjudication suits and with the final-
20. The reserved rights of many Indian tribes under the irrigable acreage standard undoubt-
edly surpass their need for the water to provide the tribe with subsistence. See, e.g., Back & Taylor,
Navajo Water Rights: Pulling the Plug on the Colorado River, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 71 (1980).
21. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV.
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ity of adjudication principles that underlie all judicial proceedings. 23
Even the more guarded position-that the government can alter the
amount of reserved rights at any time prior to binding adjudication-is
unworkable. Again, if the rights are to an "indefinite" amount of water,
Congress or the Executive could alter their amount by later action.
Thus, for example, in the National Forest setting, when Congress passed
the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act in 1960, it arguably enlarged the
primary purposes of the Organic Act of 1897 beyond the original pur-
poses of timber production and watershed protection. The Supreme
Court, however, expressly rejected in the New Mexico case the claim that
this 1960 act altered the water rights of the national forests.24
In the wilderness setting as in other settings, courts should recognize
expressly that the quantity of reserved rights is certain as of the date of
reservation. The primary intent of Congress, to preserve wilderness
lands and protect them against man-induced changes, surely requires suf-
ficient water flows in wilderness streams to prevent the types of radical
alterations in wilderness ecology depicted at the outset of this essay.
Even using the Cappaert standard of strict physical necessity, the amount
of water needed in wilderness areas is substantial. Physical data, not the
subjective views of the Secretary of Agriculture or other federal officials,
provide the measure of water needed in such areas.
II. THE DUTY To ASSERT RESERVED RIGHTS
Reserved rights cannot be lost by nonuse as can their state law coun-
terparts, appropriative rights. To date, the principal legal means to ex-
tinguish or limit reserved rights is quantification litigation, which
quantifies the federal right and results in a decree binding on the federal
government. 25 Federal legislation and negotiated settlements ratified by
Congress can also extinguish or limit reserved rights, although Congress
has yet to adopt any of these additional avenues of altering reserved
rights. 26 Thus, it is important to focus on quantification litigation.
In quantification litigation, the federal government can lose its re-
served rights by default if it fails to assert them, regardless of the good or
bad faith of the federal official who has failed to act. 27 The failure by
23. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
24. See, e.g., 438 U.S. 696, 713 n.21.
25. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
26. See, e.g., Comment, Paleface, Redskin, and the Great White Chiefs in Washington: Draw-
ing Battle Lines Over Western Water Rights, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 449 (1980); DuMars & Ingram,
Congressional Quantification of Indian Reserved Water Rights: A Definitive Solution or a Mirage?, 20
NAT. RESOURCES J. 17 (1980). See also J. SAX & R. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RE-
SOURCES 553-54 (1986); D. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 322-23 (1984).
27. In Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), the United States Department of Interior
inadequately represented the reserved water rights which protected the fishery of the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe. The tribe's only legal remedy was a damage suit against the United States for breach of
trust, not re-quantification of the inadequate reserved rights award. If representing reserved rights in
bad faith does not subject quantification to collateral attack, a loss or reduction of those rights
despite the good faith efforts of the rights holder will also be final.
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Secretary Block to assert legal claims for wilderness reserved rights in
several pending Colorado stream adjudication cases, and the resulting
jeopardy to reserved rights caused by Block's failure to act, impelled the
Sierra Club to bring the suit that provides the background for this essay.
This essay asserts in the introduction that the Secretary of Agricul-
ture, like other federal officials empowered to protect reserved rights, has
no role in denying the existence of rights and only a ministerial role in
determining their extent. That official does have, as discussed below, a
narrow role that permits a compromise settlement of reserved rights
claims when the rights might be lost absent the compromise or when
federal interests would otherwise substantially benefit from the settle-
ment. With the preceding discussion of reserved rights doctrine as back-
ground, it is now time to attempt to prove these assertions and to
demonstrate, most importantly, that federal officials possess enforceable
duties to vindicate federal water rights.
A. The Nonsubstantive Role of the Official
The first two propositions in the preceding paragraph emanate from
the simple fact that Congress (or the Executive, in the case of executive
order reservations) creates and vests reserved water rights on the date the
federal land is set aside. As discussed above, reserved rights come into
this world, like Athene, fully matured and possessed of all their essential
faculties: a priority date and a calculable flow of water. Given this heri-
tage, the views of the current federal land managers are clearly irrelevant
in determining the existence of reserved rights. In litigation determining
whether water was impliedly reserved, the only issue is the intent with
which the government reserved the land. A court does not inquire into
what current federal officials (or legal scholars) find useful in their cur-
rent work; rather, it weighs only evidence that elucidates an historical
event that Congress or the Executive completed on the date of
reservation.
The only issue, in short, is whether Congress intended to reserve
water when it withdrew lands for wilderness, and the views of the current
Secretary of Agriculture on this issue are simply irrelevant. In this as-
pect, reserved rights cases are unlike administrative law decisions that
grant special importance to a statutory interpretation made by the fed-
eral official charged with the statute's enforcement. In the reserved
rights cases, the administrative official's day-to-day experience in ad-
ministering the law does not provide special insights. The legal issue that
the court decides is historical; it is an accomplished fact.
Consider what would happen if, for example, a Secretary of Interior
believed that reserved water rights did not attach to Indian reservations.
Surely the Secretary could not advance that view in litigation without
risking a violation of the Secretary's trust responsibility to the Indians of
the reservation. In the Nevada case, for example, the Supreme Court
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afforded the Pyramid Lake Paiutes a remedy against the Department of
the Interior because the Department under-represented their entitlement
to fishing water rights in an earlier adjudication. The necessary implica-
tion of Nevada is that the amount of a reserved right, like its very exist-
ence, is a matter of fact uninfluenced by the views of any federal official.
Another example makes even plainer the irrelevance of officials'
views about the existence and extent of federal reserved water rights. As-
sume that in 1960 Congress reserved land from the public domain for the
Upper Pick-a-Name River National Recreation Area and expressly re-
served a minimum instream flow of the Pick-a-Name of 40 cubic feet per
second (cfs). Assume further that the appropriate federal official believes
no water was reserved. The view of the federal official who now manages
the recreation area is irrelevant on the issue of whether Congress in-
tended to reserve water. The official's view is not irrelevant because it is
plainly wrong; rather, it is irrelevant because it has no bearing on the
intent of Congress in 1960, and the intent of Congress in 1960 is what the
court must decide. Similarly, that same federal official may be confident
that 35 cfs will permit all the recreation uses that Congress sought to
foster. That view too must give way to the historical fact that Congress
reserved a flow of 40 cfs.
Consider next, quantification litigation about the river. If, in a gen-
eral adjudication of the Upper Pick-a-Name, the United States claimed
only a right to 35 cfs, a suit for mandamus would lie to force assertion of
a claim for the full 40 cfs. The constitutional assignment of powers pro-
vides the basis for this result. Congress, even when it delegates power to
executive agencies, retains the authority to issue the marching orders for
the federal bureaucratic army. This is true even when congressional in-
tent is less clear. The well-informed view of the federal official about the
needed flow in the Pick-a-Name would still lack any special relevance
even if Congress had failed to specify in numerical terms the amount of
the reserved flow. In such a case, the court would employ a quantifica-
tion standard based on physical necessity-the amount of water neces-
sary to carry out the prescribed recreational aims. The managing official
may hold a view about the optimum use of the resource or about the
types of boating and recreation the river can support and the quantum of
water needed to support the boating and recreation. Ultimately, how-
ever, the only relevant opinion is that of the court reached after weighing
the available evidence concerning congressional intent and the flows
needed to carry out that intent. Especially in regard to calculating the
amount of water needed, the court, as trier of fact, would rely more on
the expert testimony of the agency staff than on the editorial conclusions
of the agency head.
In reserved rights quantification litigation, the federal official is best
seen as a type of litigation counsel for the reserved water right. The offi-
cial., through the efforts of the agency staff, marshals the evidence in
favor of the water right. In a case like Sierra Club v. Block, this ministe-
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rial role devolves upon the federal official by virtue of congressional ac-
tion giving that governmental official responsibility to act as custodian of
the federal property. Congress empowers no one else to act,28 nor is any-
one else better situated to adduce the necessary proofs regarding how
much water is needed to fulfill the reservation purposes.
B. The Affirmative Duty To Pursue Reserved Rights
The most difficult to demonstrate of this essay's assertions is the
existence of an affirmative agency duty to assert reserved water rights.
That duty arises because the managing federal official's relationship to
the lands is that of a custodian; because the official is, in effect, a trustee
or steward for the American people. In a number of reserved rights
cases, the federal official's role is plainly that of a trustee, and the role
requires the official to fulfill fiduciary duties to vindicate reserved rights
that benefit others. For example, when the Interior Department repre-
sents a tribe in Indian reserved rights cases, the Interior Department
owes duties to the tribe and must assert the reserved rights to the fullest
extent. A harder case arises when the federal official who is the custo-
dian of the federal property (the reserved rights) also oversees the federal
operations on the benefited land. In such a case, there is no identifiable
group like an Indian tribe to whom fiduciary or trust duties are owed.
Wilderness areas and National Parks present cases of this harder type.
To the extent that even these hard cases are aptly labeled custodian-
ships or trusteeships, they too fit easily into this essay's schema. If wil-
derness reserved rights exist, the government vests them as federal
property in the constructive custody of the Secretary of Agriculture (or
Interior) in much the same way that gold is in the custody of the federal
official commanding Fort Knox. No one would claim that the com-
mander of Fort Knox lacked an enforceable duty to refrain from losing
the gold by inaction or default. So too, no one should say that the Secre-
tary can sit idly by and fail to prevent the destruction of vested federal
property rights, especially when the rights sub judice are by definition
''necessary" to his mission as manager of wilderness.
The custodial duty analysis gains support from the traditional pos-
ture of sovereign ownership of natural resources as ownership impressed
with a trust. The public trust doctrine in water law is a good example of
a judicial finding that the government must preserve trust property for
the common good. For example, in the famous Illinois Central public
trust case, the court found that the Illinois legislature lacked the power
to alienate irrevocably the lands and superjacent waters adjoining Chi-
cago.2 9 In the reserved rights setting, a decision to default or to assert no
28. Cf Valleyforge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982) (limiting private party standing to challenge disposition of federal property on
establishment clause grounds).
29. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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reserved rights in a lawsuit that can extinguish those reserved water
rights threatens permanent alienation of the water, water that, as noted
before, is by legal definition "necessary" to fulfill the purposes of the set
aside land. Even if a custodial default of this type is not itself a breach of
trust, the loss of water that is "necessary" to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation is a breach of duty. Losing the water and with it the means
to succeed in managing the reservation is a breach of the duty assigned to
the official by Congress or the Executive when it delegated the authority
to manage the resource in the first place.
C. Distinguishing Cases Where Deference Is Due
The custodial view that finds enforceable duties to pursue reserved
water rights departs from administrative law doctrines favoring judicial
deference to administrative decisionmaking. The deferential review doc-
trines have special force when the issues involve administrative decisions
refusing to pursue enforcement actions. In Heckler v. Chaney3" the
Supreme Court held that courts should presume that administrative en-
forcement decisions meeting certain criteria are within the unreviewable
discretion of the agency. In Heckler death row inmates attempted to
require the Food and Drug Administration to take enforcement action
preventing the use of a number of drugs for lethal injections. The in-
mates' complaint alleged several violations of the relevant statute, each of
which arguably provided a sufficient ground for FDA enforcement ac-
tions. Enforcement would have benefited the inmates by preventing
prison officials from using the drugs for lethal injections. The Supreme
Court sustained the FDA's claim that it had discretion to refuse enforce-
ment. The Supreme Court found the matter committed to agency discre-
tion; further, that discretion was unreviewable by a court.3 '
The applicability of Heckler to the reserved rights context is no
more than slight. Heckler rested on an interpretation of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA);32 in particular, Section 706, which sets forth
the rules for judicial review of agency action. The basic position of the
APA is that all agency actions and failures to act 33 are subject to judicial
review.34 Section 701(a) announces two exceptions to the reviewability
norm: first, when the governing statute precludes review and, second,
when the matter "is committed to agency discretion by law."35
The Supreme Court used the second exception to reviewability to
support its finding that courts could not review the nonenforcement deci-
sion in Heckler. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion found that several
30. 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985).
31. Id. at 1659. For an excellent discussion of this case and the relevant administrative law,
see Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CH1. L. REV. 653 (1985).
32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
33. The Act defines "failures to act" as the equivalent of actions. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1982).
34. See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 655.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982).
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factors gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that nonenforcement deci-
sions fit within the second exception, thereby shielding them from judi-
cial review under the APA.3 6 The factors included: (1) the wide range of
considerations that affect setting enforcement priorities, (2) the noncoer-
cive nature of nonenforcement decisions, (3) the fact that inaction, unlike
action, provides little focus for judicial review, and (4) the similarity to
prosecutorial discretion regarding indictments, a discretion which impli-
cates the "take care" clause of the Constitution 37 authorizing the execu-
tive branch to enforce the laws without inappropriate judicial oversight.
The presumption could be overcome if "the substantive statute has pro-
vided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement
powers."
38
Heckler does not control the reserved rights situation. "Enforcing"
reserved rights and "enforcing" substantive statutes against targeted vio-
lators are distinctly different tasks. The former is not an enforcement
proceeding at all; it is a defense of a vested property right of the United
States against possible loss. The United States is a defendant in most
reserved rights cases. As a defendant, the United States does not exercise
any prosecutorial discretion when it asserts its rights to the water.
Even if Heckler applied to the failure to enforce reserved rights, the
Heckler factors that trigger a presumption of nonreviewability would not
support the presumption in the reserved rights situation. Of the four
factors, only the first is present in a refusal to "prosecute" reserved
rights. The second and fourth factors are inapposite when the federal
government is not coercing anyone, but only laying claim to water rights
in the context of a general lawsuit. A ready focus exists for review of a
failure to assert reserved rights. The finality that courts will accord the
general adjudication makes a failure to assert reserved rights a final deci-
sion to forfeit those rights. To the extent that a party with standing to
complain raises the issue,39 an extraordinarily concrete case ripe for deci-
sion arises. The legal duties of the administrative official are plain: the
official must do what is necessary to fulfill the reservation intent, which
requires him to claim precisely as much water as the government
reserved.
The first of the Heckler factors creates intra-institutional compe-
tence questions about the allocation of an agency's limited resources.
Although this consideration is present in the reserved rights setting, it
does not by itself trigger the presumption of unreviewability. The Secre-
tary has only limited resources with which to fulfill the many mandates
of the office, and the vigorous assertion of all reserved rights might tax
those resources. A quest for rights to instream flows in all wilderness
36. 105 S. Ct. at 1656.
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
38. 105 S. Ct. at 1656.
39. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 847-49 (D. Colo. 1985).
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areas could involve the Secretary in a welter of cases throughout the
West. Multiple litigation would be a demanding undertaking which
might not, in the Secretary's view, involve sufficiently important interests
when weighed against other administrative responsibilities that the same
staff must meet out of a limited budget.
Even if the Secretary's administrative management dilemma is
real,4° the forfeiture of federal water rights is not a permissible way to
solve the problem. Consider, for example, the plight of a trustee under
ordinary trust law who finds the conservation of the trust's assets un-
workably expensive. The trustee cannot jettison valuable trust assets
without the consent of the settlor of the trust or of a court that reviews
and approves the trustee's action.4 Here, where Congress has created
these rights that are "necessary" to the enterprise, the proper course of
administrative action surely lies in seeking legislative or judicial relief
from the predicament rather than abandoning the rights.
D. The Narrow Range Of Permissible Discretion
To this point, this essay has argued that federal officials must act to
vindicate reserved rights, lest their inaction cause a forfeiture. It has ar-
gued also that these rights are of a determinate magnitude. In combina-
tion, these two propositions imply that federal officials in reserved rights
cases should seek an award of the full amount of water that Congress
reserved. Fettering the administrative officer in this fashion would trans-
form the officer into the legal advocate of the reservation, much like the
role of the Department of Interior as representative of Indian tribes' re-
served water rights. The Indian reserved rights example of a federal offi-
cial as the lawyer for the right's holder can be extended to all reserved
rights cases. In the wilderness setting, however, the "client" that the
federal government represents is not the Secretary of Agriculture, the
nominal party in the litigation, but either the Congress that reserved the
water or the American people who are the intended beneficiaries of the
reservation.
A model of the federal administrative officer as advocate or attor-
ney, and not as principal is well-suited to reserved rights litigation and
defines the role of the federal agency head and agency staff. The amount
of water necessary to fulfill the purposes of a reservation, though fixed, is
not always easily established by competent proof. The National Forest
reserved rights litigation is a prime example of the difficulty facing the
federal administrative officer in the role of advocate. New Mexico settled
40. In a landmark Colorado quantification case involving numerous reserved rights claims,
federal officials claimed that they would be unable to meet a rigorous six-month time deadline in
regard to the quantification of reserved rights claims. After indicating that it did not think the six-
month period unreasonable, the Colorado Supreme Court went on to say that "[I]f unexpected diffi-
culties arise during quantification, the federal government may seek an extension of time from the
water court." United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 30 (Colo. 1982).
41. 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts, § 380 (1975).
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the historical fact issue that the 1897 Organic Act and the 1960 Multiple
Use and Sustained Yield Act had as primary purposes timber growth and
watershed protection. Thereafter, the Forest Service could no longer
seek to obtain reserved rights protection for National Forest instream
flows by referring to recreation uses and similar uses plainly served by
minimum streamflows.
Rather than abandoning reserved rights streamflow claims after the
New Mexico setback, the Forest Service as reserved rights advocate con-
tinued to seek maximum streamflow rights in pending litigation.42 First,
the Service claimed that streamflows were necessary for continued timber
growth in the forests. When pressed in litigation, however, the Service
was unable to marshal persuasive supporting evidence.43 The Service
next attempted to adduce evidence that instream flows in the forests in-
sured favorable streamflow conditions for state law appropriators. The
Service developed a theory of channel maintenance which required con-
tinuous instream flows to transport sediments downstream to maintain
viable stream channels. Absent viable channels, greater erosion occurs
and streams meander, back up, and flood. As a result, water loss to evap-
oration and seepage increases. In short, the Service tried to prove that
viable channels maintained by minimum streamflows are necessary to in-
sure the continued streamflow quantity and quality that was a primary
purpose of the National Forest legislation." The roles of the federal offi-
cial and the agency became like those of an attorney and retained experts
trying to win a contested issue of fact regarding the amount of water
needed to fulfill reservation purposes.
The attorney or advocate image suggests the circumstances in which
an official could exercise discretion and opt to compromise reserved
rights claims without breaching the representational duty to seek the full
measure of reserved rights. Normally, when a client's rights are at risk in
litigation, an attorney will seek to negotiate a compromise settlement
rather than litigate if the settlement option serves the client's best inter-
ests. The risk of a loss, or of an incomplete victory in court, coupled with
the financial burdens of trial, favor settlement of all but the surest victo-
ries. Like most cases, the results of reserved rights cases are somewhat
unpredictable and the official should not dismiss the risks of loss or ex-
pense of litigation as trivial.
Consider the surest of all reserved rights settings, Indian reserved
rights for irrigation under the irrigable acreage standard. Barring a ma-
jor Supreme Court reversal of existing doctrine, the official could esti-
mate the probable outcome of these cases by multiplying the number of
42. See generally Shupe, Reserved Instream Flows In The National Forests: Round Two, W.
NAT. RESOURCE LITIG. DIG. Spring 1985, 13B 16(a) at 23.
43. United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 22 n.35 (Colo. 1982).
44. See United States Forest Service, A Procedure and Rationale for Securing Favorable Condi-
tions of Water Flows on National Forest System Lands in Northern Wyoming, Draft Report (1982).
See also Shupe, supra note 42, at 28.
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irrigable acres by the applicable water duty.45 Even here, the difficulty
and expense of proving the precise number of irrigable acres and the pre-
cise water duty provide an incentive to negotiate and settle. In the In-
dian context, the tribe is an easily identified client to whom the federal
official, like an attorney, recommends settlement. The federal official
does not ultimately decide whether to forego some portion of the right to
gain certain victory by settlement. The federal official's role instead is
that of advising the client that the settlement best serves the client's inter-
ests. In this advisory capacity, the official does not recommend a com-
promise based on the federal official's own interests or predilections
about reserved rights-the standard for compromise is the client's best
interest.
Because the real client in many reserved rights cases is either the
Congress that years ago created the reservation (not unlike the deceased
settlor of a trust) or the American people as a whole, it is impossible for
the federal official to seek the client's informed approval of any settle-
ment that falls short of total victory. In those cases, the federal official
fills two roles. First, as holder or manager of the affected lands the fed-
eral official becomes the alter ego of the real client; simultaneously, the
federal official serves as the director of the legal team that fights to vindi-
cate the reserved rights. Although the two roles are distinct, the stan-
dard for recommending and accepting a compromise is monolithic. The
official as attorney must strive to achieve the best possible result for the
client; that same official, as custodian of valuable federal property rights
which belong to the real client, can accept no less.
A best-interests-of-the-client standard, applied for compromise, will
not vest the federal official with so much latitude to compromise reserved
rights cases that the official can bypass the duty of ardent representation.
For example, assume in the wilderness reserved rights setting that the
Secretary of Agriculture, as advocate, believes in good faith that the ex-
act quantity of instream flow needed to preserve the wilderness will be
hard to prove and that no major upstream diversions are occurring or
planned for any of the streams that traverse the wilderness. Can the Sec-
retary simply default by claiming that default satisfies the best-interests
standard because it saves costs and because the rights at issue are
unimportant?
A court should not allow the Secretary to default under these cir-
cumstances. If it did permit default, a court would have wrongly
equated the best interests of the official as administrator with the best
interests of that same official as the persona of a reserved-rights-holding
client. The assumed difficulty of proof, standing alone, may permit the
official to compromise and settle, but it cannot justify a default of the
case. Assuming as the hypothetical does that the rights do exist, they are
45. Cf J. SAX & R. ABRAMS, supra note 26, at 548-53 (some opponents of Indian reserved
water rights questioning the continued application of the irrigable acreage standard).
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the rights that Congress reserved under the 1964 Wilderness Act and
they attach to some quantity of water. A default in the case loses
whatever rights exist. If the Secretary can adduce some evidence of the
need for flows to support wilderness, that evidence will lead to an award
of reserved rights in favor of the wilderness. At the very worst, the prof-
fered evidence will be insufficient and the litigation will fail to win any
rights, leaving the client as badly off as would a default. The federal
official fails to serve the client's best interest by foregoing whatever hopes
the client has of preserving a legal entitlement. The official will save liti-
gation effort, which will benefit the administrative official in his role as
manager of a bureaucratic department. Staff time not channelled into
reserved rights litigation is available to pursue other projects. Even so, as
decisionmaker in this instance, the official's custodial or trust responsibil-
ity supercedes administrative convenience.
The cases in which federal officials may compromise reserved rights
are of two kinds. First, when reserved rights holders face a real threat of
loss, the administrative official may seek a compromise settlement that
does not frustrate the purposes for which Congress reserved the lands,
but is less than all the water that Congress arguably reserved. Here, the
judgment of the official involves the subjective weighing of probabilities
concerning the likely outcome of litigation and more objective assess-
ments regarding the exact water needs of the reserved lands. Although
this judgment should not be completely free from judicial scrutiny, defer-
ential judicial review is appropriate in this setting.
The other situation that justifies compromise of reserved rights
arises when the settlement generates benefits apart from the right to the
water itself. For example, in the Indian reserved water rights context,
settlement terms that reduce the magnitude of the water rights might be
attractive if the tribes also receive nonwater considerations. Such consid-
erations may include money or in-kind construction of water projects
that enable the tribe to exercise its rights.
III. CONCLUSION
A rule insuring that water will always flow in the wilderness is only
one of the many important manifestations of a well-developed reserved
rights doctrine. Because a default by an administrative official can vitiate
such rights, controls on official discretion are as vital a part of the re-
served rights doctrine as any substantive issue. The litigation challenging
the Secretary of Agriculture's failure to protect wilderness area reserved
rights is a case in point. The initial legal position of the Secretary, who
has claimed that no reserved rights exist and that he possesses a total,
unreviewable discretion to refuse to protect those rights, bespeaks a fun-
damental misconception of the law of reserved rights on the part of the
Secretary.
Perhaps the Secretary is not at fault, for the magnitude of his error
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is apparent only after a careful inquiry into the complex nature of the law
that surrounds reserved rights and the obligations of federal officials who
are the custodians of those valuable, necessary property rights. The Sec-
retary's position ignores the genesis of reserved rights and the custodial
duties of his office as the alter ego of the real client, the beneficiaries of
the reserved rights. An official in this position has no role in deciding the
existence of the rights, only a ministerial role in producing evidence re-
garding the extent of the right, and a judicially reviewable duty to fully
assert those rights. The only qualification of that duty is that the official
can temper an attempt to win the full amount of the rights by compro-
mising if the rights otherwise may be lost or if the official by doing so can
gain important nonwater rights benefits. Even then, a court should stand
ready to review the compromise decision.46
46. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 30; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971). Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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